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MINNESOTA
LAW REVIEW
Journal of the State Bar Association
VOLUME 35 MAY, 1951 No. 6
FORTY YEARS OF AMERICAN WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION*
By STEFAN A. RIESENFELD**
I. BACKGROUND AND ORIGIN OF AMERICAN
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
T HE year 1951 marks the 40th anniversary of continuously oper-
ating workmen's compensation legislation in the United States.
For in 1911 the compensation acts of California, Illinois, Kansas,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Nevada, Ohio,
Washington and Wisconsin' went into effect, constituting the first
group of state statutes to withstand constitutional attacks and to
remain, with more or less radical changes, operative until the
present day. This legislation marked the beginning of a new era in
the law governing work-injuries and spelled curtains for an an-
tiquated approach to the problem of the injured workman, for con-
stitutional squabbles and for judicial obstacles to progress.
Of course the compensations acts of these ten pioneer states had
very important precursors. But the first legislative attempts in
this field were limited and sporadic, and with one exception fell
victim to the fatal verdict of unconstitutionality. Maryland actually
as early as in 1902 established a Cooperative Accident Fund for
certain perilous occupations.2 But it did not stand the test of
*This article, printed concurrently by arrangement with the NACCA
Law Journal, constitutes the annotated form of the first of two lectures
which were given on November 25th and 27th, 1950, at the University of
Minnesota as the Gleason Lectures on Workmen's Compensation, sponsored
by N.A.C.C.A. The second lecture was entitled Problems of Workmen's
Compensation Administration.
**Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. Cal. Stats. 1911, c. 399; Ill. Laws 1911, 314; Kan. Laws 1911, c.
218; Mass. Acts and Res. 1911, c. 751; N. H. Laws 1911, c. 163; N. J. Acts
1911, c. 95; Nev. Stats. 1911, c. 183; Ohio Laws 1911, 524; Wash. Laws
1911, c. 74; Wis. Laws 1911, c. 50.
2. Md. Laws 902, c. 139; see The State Cooperative Accident Fund of
Maryland, U. S. Bureau of Labor, Bull. No. 9, 645 (1904).
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judicial attack.3 Massachusetts enacted a voluntary compensation
statute in 1908.4 But it remained a dead letter. Congress itself like-
wise acted in the same year,5 thanks to the ardent pleas by President
Theodore Roosevelt, who was the early champion of compensation
legislation.6 But the congressional act benefited only federal em-
ployees. Montana initiated compensation legislation for the mining
industry in the following year 7 but the courts again repudiated
it.8 New York in the next year finally became the first state to
enact comprehensive workmen's compensation legislation, con-
sisting of two complementary acts, of which one established com-
pulsory coverage while the other provided for a voluntary systemY
But in a decision'0 that created a national sensation"1 the highest
court of that state invalidated the more important one of the twin
acts on constitutional grounds.
The legislative movement which was initiated by the federal
act of 1908 and the ten pioneer state acts of 1911 kept its momentum
and gradually swept the nation, particularly after the Supreme
Court in three forward looking opinions had set at rest the con-
stitutional doubts. 12 Mississippi was the last state to fall in line 3
and today 48 state and 6 federal and territorial compensation acts'-
operate on the American scene, covering a substantial portion
of the labor force in the United States.15
3. Franklin v. United Railways and Electric Co. of Baltimore, 2
Baltimore City Rep. 309 (1904).
4. Mass. Acts and Resolves 1908, c. 489.
5. 35 Stat. 556 (1908).
6. See the various messages of President Roosevelt to Congress, espe-
cially his annual message of 1906, 41 Cong. Rec. 22, 26 (1906) and the
messages of Dec. 3, 1907, 42 Cong. Rec. 69, 72 (1907) and of Jan. 31, 1908,
42 Cong. Rec. 1347 (1908).
7. Mont. Laws 1909, c. 67.
8. Cunningham v. Northwestern Improvement Co., 44 Mont. 180, 119
Pac. 554 (1911).
9. N. Y. Laws 1910, c. 674 (compulsory coverage for certain dangerous
employments) ; N. Y. Laws 1910, c. 352, § 3 (voluntary system).
10. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 200 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431 (1911).
11. See, e.g., the Symposium in 25 Survey 185 (1911).
12. New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247,
61 L. Ed. 667 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 37 Sup. Ct. 255,
61 L. Ed. 678 (1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219,
37 Sup. Ct. 260, 61 L. Ed. 685 (1917).
13. Miss. Laws 1948, c. 354.
14. I.e., the compensation acts for Alaska, the District of Columbia,
Hawaii and Puerto Rico, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act
and the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. An additional compensation
system operates in the Virgin Islands in the Municipalities of St. Thomas and
St. John. A set of laws passed by the municipal councils and the legislative
assembly of the Virgin Islands, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., H. Doc. No. 366, 80(1941).15. No accurate statistics regarding the number of employees actually
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Workmen's compensation is designed to protect the worker
against substandard living conditions resulting from work-injuries.16
With almost 1,900,000 disabling injuries of that kind occurring
in 194717 the social significance of the field can hardly be over-
estimated. This type of legislation was prompted because the rules
which governed prior thereto were predicated on notions of fault
and failed dismally to protect the injured workman. The proof
necessary for a recovery was difficult and cumbersome and neces-
sitated protracted litigation. Recoveries were consequently rare
and greatly reduced by costs and fees. For the injured worker and
his family it was at best a venture of too little and too late.
Of course, the new system in the United States was not a ven-
ture for which there was no model elsewhere. Germany' s and
England9 had embarked in protective legislation of that character
many years before, although the actual systems of the two countries
differed considerably. There was originally much disagreement in
the United States as to which of the two was the preferable pattern
and the pioneer statutes borrowed to a varying degree from both
schemes.2 0 Perhaps even more interesting is the fact that labor at
first showed little interest in the matter and actually fought some
of the early proposals. 21 Enlightened public officials,22 political
covered by the existing 54 compensation statutes exist. The elective character
of 26 state acts as well as the variations in the minimum number of employees
required for coverage and in the other exemptions preclude even a reliable
estimate. It seems, however, safe to conclude that at least more than fifty
percent of all employed workers are now covered. See McCamman, Work-
men's Compensation: Coverage, Premiums m d Paynents, 13 Social Security
Bulletin No. 7, 3 (1950).
16. For a detailed presentation of the different legislative programs
operating in the United States to prevent or remedy substandard living con-
ditions resulting from the various hazards of modern life see Riesenfeld and
Maxwell, Modern Social Legislation (1950).
17. For recent statistics see Work Injuries in 1949: Preliminary Esti-
mates, 70 Month. Lab. Rev. 265 (1950); Work Injuries in the United
States, 1949, 71 Month. Lab. Rev. 478 (1950).
18. The German Industrial Accident Insurance Act of 1884 was the
first in a series of social insurance laws sponsored by the imperial govern-
ment to curb the spread of the socialist party. See Brooks, Compulsory In-
surance in Germany, Fourth Special Report of the U. S. Commissioner of
Labor 84 (1893).
19. 60 & 61 Vict. c. 37 (1897).
20. About the influence of the German system on Washington's Indus-
trial Insurance Law of 1911, see the comments by Judge Bausman in Stertz
v. Industrial Commission, 91 Wash. 588, 590, 158 Pac. 256, 258 (1916). See
also Sherman, Cazt the German Workmen's Insurance Law be Adopted to
American Conditions?, 61 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1912).
21. Some of the reasons for labor's hostility were well taken, especially
their concern about over-standardization and the discrimination against
younger workers.
22. Especially Carrol D. Wright, the U. S. Commissioner of Labor, and
J. McMackin of the New York Bureau of Labor Statistics.
19511
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leaders 2  and most of all academic men2 4 were the true standard
bearers of the movement. But a convincing study of the New York
legislative investigatory commission on the plight of the injured
workmen and cost and waste involved in the existing system, which
was published in 1910,25 exerted a profound influence on the leaders
in the American labor movement 26 and from then on they took
an active part in the promotion of compensation legislation.
It should be noted that the New York legislative investiga-
tion of the defects in the existing law relating to work-injuries
was not an isolated event. Similar movements reached the legisla-
tive level in other jurisdictions at the same time.27 Among them
was Minnesota where, owing to the efforts of its governor and some
prominent members of its bar, including Pierce Butler who later
became a Justice of the Supreme Court, a legislative investigatory
commission was appointed in 1909. 2 ' This commission called the
first National Conference on Workmen's Compensation which was
held in Atlantic City, July 29-31, 1909, and constituted an im-
portant milestone in the American development.
The period of forty years which thus began in 1911 when the
efforts of these pioneers in social legislation first produced lasting
legislative results has witnessed a tremendous expansion and
liberalization of the protection originally envisaged, especially be-
cause of progressive judicial enlightenment. A brief analysis of the
main trends and currents which have occurred in the field during
23. Theodore Roosevelt, in particular, took an active interest in the
promotion of compensation legislation both as Governor of New York and
President of the United States, see also note 6 rupra.
24. Leaders in that movement for social insurance were especially
Professors Henderson of the University of Chicago and Seager of Columbia
University; see Henderson, Industrial Insurance in the United States (1910)
Seager, Social Insurance (1910).
25. Report to the Legislature of the State of New York by the Com-
mission to Inquire into the Question of Employers' Liability and Other
Matters, First Report (1910).
26. See Gompers, The Price We Pay, 17 Am. Federationist (part 2)
665 (1910).
27. Legislative or gubernatorial investigatory commissions on the sub-ject of workmen's compensation were appointed in Minnesota, New York
and Wisconsin in 1909 and in Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana,
New Jersey, Ohio, Washington and by Congress in 1910. For a summary of
some of these reports see Clark, Workmen's Compensatio and Inmirance,
22 Bull. Bur. of Labor 97 (1911) ; see also Riesenfeld and Maxwell, Modem
Social Legislation 1-33, 134, 137 (1950); Dodd, Administration of Work-
men's Compensation 18 ff. (1936).
28. See Minnesota, Dep't of Labor & Industry, 31st Bienniel Rep.
1947-1948, 103.
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the four decades of its operation is the main object of my lecture
today.
29
II.
THEORY AND NATURE OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
While on the administrative and judicial level questions in-
volving the scope of the protection under the applicable compensa-
tion acts present themselves generally as problems of statutory
construction, actually in the end they always resolve themselves
into a consideration of the basic policy and nature of this type of
legislation. Workmen's compensation, as stated before, has the
purpose of protecting the worker from a life on a substandard level
as the result of a disabling work injury. Although the compensa-
tion acts of most jurisdictions are complicated and extremely techni-
cal pieces of legislation their basic theory is clear and simple. Per-
haps the most dramatic formulation of it is a slogan ascribed to
David Lloyd George,30 even though the speaker has never been
able to verify this authorship. This slogan states that "The cost of
the product should bear the blood of the workingman." Of course
clich6s like that usually possess delusive simplicity and occasionally
do more harm than good. It is perhaps more accurate though less
colorful to say that workmen's compensation is social insurance
against a particular hazard of modern life. The negative implica-
tion flowing from this nature of workmen's compensation is that it
is fundamentally and intrinsically different from tort liability. Be.
cause of the many consequences which flow from this insight and
the frequency with which courts and textwriters have been oblivious
to this simple truth it may be well to elaborate on this argument.
The fact that the incidents of compensation liability may re-
flect themselves in the cost of the product and thus be shifted to
the ultimate consumer 3' is in itself neither a differentiating nor an
essential factor. Tort liability will likewise appear as a part of the
cost of the product and is to no lesser degree passed on to the con-
sumer public. The differentiation between .compensation and tort
29. For a more detailed treatment, see Horovitz, Current Trends in
Workmen's Compensation (1947); Riesenfed and Maxwell, Modern Social
Legislation 127-440 (1950).
30. See Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 519 (1941).
31. The extent to which added costs of the-production can be shifted
to the consumers rather than being absorbed by the wage-earners in the
form of a reduction of wages or by the enterpreneur in the form of a reduc-
tion of profits is actually a complicated problem of economic theory about
which there is apparently much controversy among the experts,* see Witte,
The Theory of Workmen!'s Compensation, 20 Am. Lab. Leg. Rev. 411(1930).
1951]
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liability, especially if there is insurance against either, is actually
quite sophisticated and a matter of tradition. Certainly it is a
naive over-simplification to say that "tort liability is, by its nature,
expected to hurt the defendant. '8 2 Classical tort principles impose
upon the enterprise the risk of a variety of hazards according to
more or less crystallized policies ordinarily involving notions of
foreseeability and failure to exercise control. Workmen's compensa-
tion on the other hand imposes upon the industry the risk of one
particular class of hazards (work-injuries of the employees) and
follows policies which are special and separate. Thus while tort
and compensation principles as applied to industry both involve
essentially a distribution of risk, the underlying policies governing
this distribution (the rationes distribuendi) are not identical. It is
interesting to observe that Justice Cardozo, one of the most pro-
found thinkers in such matters, made this very point 3 and thus
exhibited greater insight into the differences in the underlying
policy considerations which determine the criteria for risk distribu-
tion than a famous tort expert who unduly slighted them.34
Workmen's compensation is basically a branch of social insur-
ance. 3 4a Again it might be well to emphasize that the mere fact that
the employers in all states, except perhaps one, must insure their lia-
bility with a private company, become subscribers to a state fund
or qualify as self-insurers 5 is in itself not the essential insurance
feature. Workmen's compensation was social insurance even dur-
ing the early years when such duty to insure did not exist. The real
characteristic of social insurance is the fact that the worker is
entitled to the benefits as a matter of right, irrespective of need; that
the hazard which is involved is a typified hazard of modem society:
loss or reduction of earning power; and that there is a certain
standardization of benefits and de-technicalization in the proce-
dure. 6 Workmen's compensation as social insurance is thus a
member of the great family of American social insurance programs,
32. So unfortunately an otherwise comprehending commentator, Larson,
The Welfare State and Workmen's Compensation, 5 NACCA L. J. 18, 31
(1950).
33. See the comments by Justice Cardozo in Babington v. Yellow Taxi
Corp., 250 N. Y. 14, 164 N. E. 726 (1928).
34. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 Col. L. Rev. 444, 716, at 456 (1923).
34a. The nature of workmen's compensation as social insurance has
recently been recognized by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 78 A. 2d
709, 713 (N.J. 1951).
35. For details see Riesenfeld and Maxwell, Modern Social Legisla-
tion, 147, 368-394 (1950).
36. The aspects of standardization and de-technicalization form the
subject of my second lecture, Problems of Workmen's Compensation Ad-
ministration.
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comprised, in addition, of old-age and survivors insurance, unem-
ployment insurance and the new-comer in that class-sickness cash
benefits insurance.3 7
The principle that workmen's compensation is social insurance
and not tort liability should furnish the clue to all difficult prob-
lems of statutory construction. Its neglect is the cardinal sin against
the injured workman. This none of the traditional restrictive tort
doctrines such as "scope of employment," "proximate causation,"
"assumption of risk" and "blameworthiness" should ever be relied
upon in compensation cases. As we will see, the courts have gradu-
ally come to recognize this policy. It should be added that while
the capacity of industry to pass the cost on to consumers and
patrons is perhaps an important consideration in the imposition of
risks upon it,; the possibility of such transference is not necessarily
a conditio sine qua non of compensation coverage. Thus there is
no convincing reason why a charitable or non-profit organization
should not likewise bear the risk of work-injuries of their employees
incurred in the performance of its function. An illustrative ex-
ample of the faulty approach is the decision of Caughman v.
Columbia Y.M.C.A. 3s In that case the question in issue was
whether or not a charitable organization such as the Y.M.C.A. was
liable for compensation to an injured employee. The court ad-
mitted that "the definitions of employers and employees who are
subject to the provisions of the Act are very broad and compre-
hensive and entirely sufficient to include charitable institutions."
Nevertheless it denied relief to the injured employee because ac-
cording to the controlling South Carolina law charitable organiza-
tions are not liable in tort and therefore "by implication" excluded
from compensation liability which was "substitutional in charac-
ter." This reasoning shows patently the undesirable results which
flow from the wrong characterization of the nature of compensa-
tion. Fortunately a number of other jurisdictions have taken a
more enlightened approach on that issue. 9
37. Insurance programs of the latter type exist in California, New
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Washington and under the Railroad Un-
employment Insurance Act, see Riesenfeld and Maxwell, Modern Social
Legislation 445 (1950).
38. 212 S. C. 337, 47 S. E. 2d 788, 33 Minn. L. Rev. 440 (1948).
39. See, for instance, Schneider v. Salvation Army, 217 Minn. 448,
14 N. W. 2d 467 (1944) ; Gardner v. Trustees of M. E. Church, 217 Iowa
1390, 250 N. IV. 740 (1933). The latter case is perhaps also remarkable
because the court disposed of the defendant's contention that the injured
workman's employment by the church was merely casual and not in the em-
ployer's trade or busiiness with the reference to the scriptural words: "I must
be about my Father's business."
1951]
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Perhaps the last point which ought to be made in that connec-
tion is the thesis that workmen's compensation is not only radically
different from tort liability, but also that its basis is not contract.
It is properly classified as a status. 40 This holds true regardless of
whether a state has a compulsory or a so-called elective system,
41
or whether compensation liability is imposed upon the employer
and his private insurance carrier or upon a state fund to which an
employer must subscribe. Although courts have occasionally classi-
fied workmen's compensation liability, particularly if of the elective
type,42 as contractual, this error happily has not too frequently
entailed results which are socially undesirable. The courts have
ordinarily recognized that the content of the legal relation between
the worker and the employer and the insurance carrier is deter-
mined by statute. Nevertheless there are instances where the tech-
nical difference between contract and status becomes material and
should be kept in mind.
4 3
III.
THE "RED-SHIFT" IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Modern physics tells us that the major secret of nature still
unsolved is the phenomenon that the spectral lines of light coming
from the outer spaces have exhibited through a period of careful
measurements a demonstrable shift towards one side of the spec-
trum, the so-called "red-shift." Outstanding experts have deduced
therefrom that the universe is gradually and steadily expanding.
The following remarks are designed to focus attention upon the
gradual and continuous expansion of the scope of workmen's com-
pensation during its journey of 40 years, and deal therefore with
what one may call with a borrowed term the red-shift in work-
men's compensation.
The progressive liberalization of workmen's compensation has
been accomplished by a fascinating interplay of legislative fiat and
increasing judicial enlightenment. It can perhaps be best gauged
40. Leadership in the classification of workmen's compensation as
status relation was assumed by the United States Supreme Court, especially
in the pioneering decision of Parramore v. Cudahy Packing Co., 263 U. S.
418, 44 Sup. Ct. 153, 68 L. Ed. 366 (1923).
41. Actually in most of the 26 states still adhering to that system,
elective coverage is "presumed" and requires a formal rejection, see Note,
60 Harv. L. Rev. 1131 (1947).
42. See, e.g., Secrest v. Galloway Co., 239 Iowa 168, 171, 30 N. W.
2d 793, 794 (1948).
43. Such instances are the status of minors, problems involving the
conflict of laws, etc.
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by a careful comparison of the two outstanding studies of the field
which, as it were, sandwich in the evolution of 40 years, viz. Francis
Bohlen's, "A Problem in the Drafting of Compensation Acts"' 44
and Samuel Horowitz's, "Current Trends in Workmen's Com-
pensation." 45
Since workmen's compensation is designed to protect the work-
man against destitution resulting from work-injuries, the three
pillars upon which the coverage rests are: a) the existence of the
requisite employment relation, b) the occurrence of a disabling
injury of the specified type and c) the attributability of the injury
to the employment. The statutory language, borrowed from the
original English act4" usually refers to a personal injury by acci-
dent, arising out of and in the course of the employment, sustained
by an employee. Our inquiry therefore will briefly survey the
vicissitudes and liberalization of the three phrases "employment,"
"personal injury by accident" and "in the course and out of the
employment."
A.
The Requisite Employment Relationship
The classical common law thought in terms of master and
servant. It evolved certain tests for the existence of that relation-
ship mainly for the purpose of delimiting the scope of liability of
the master to a third person incurred by the tortious conduct of
his servant.47 This" branch of the law consequently does not con-
cern itself with questions relating to the status or the legal protec-
tion of the employee. Tort liability to the victim is not imposed if
the immediate tort-feasor has not acted in the capacity of a servant
but in that of an independent contractor.
The proper use of these terms to define workmen's compensa-
tion coverage requires great caution. It is always necessary to bear
in mind the difference in intellectual climate in which these con-
cepts grew up.48 The federal Supreme Court has pointed out that
the existence of an employment relationship, if required for pur-
44. 25 Harv. L. Rev. 328, 401, 517 (1912).
45. 12 Law Soc. J. 465, 611,765 (1947).
46. 60 & 61 Vict. c. 37, § 1(1) (1897).
47. For a modern list of the factors determinative of the existence or
absence of the master and servant relation see Restatement of the Law of
Agency, Chapter 7, especially § 220.
48. See the penetrating comments by Justice Wolfe regarding this dif-
ference in Determination of Employer-Employee Relationships in Social
Legislation, 41 Col. L. Rev. 1015 (1941). See also Riesenfeld and Maxwell,
Modem Social Legislation 26 ff., 162 ff., 517 ff., 608 ff. (1950).
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poses of social legislation should not be determined by slavish
reliance on common law tests but by elaborating an independent
suitable set of criteria. The Court, to be sure, developed these views
for different social insurance programs such as old-age and sur-
vivors insurance and unemployment insurance 5 and other laws
regulating employees' rights.50 But the Supreme Court's famous
"economic reality" test rather than the common law control test
should also govern the coverage under the workmen's compensa-
tion acts and at least a few progressive decisions have specifically
held so.5 At any rate, the applicable test for the coverage should
be liberally construed in favor of the injured workmen and by and
large the courts have become fairly enlightened on that subject.5-2
The coverage of minors, especially if illegally employed, of
spouses, of working partners and corporate officers is still a trouble-
some question in many jurisdictions.5" But gradually statutory
amendments and modernistic tendencies among the courts have
eradicated many of the restrictions resulting from the blind trans-
plantation of common law rules.5 4
Wrhile the range of covered employments has been broadened in
most jurisdictions in the course of time, too many jurisdictions
still have size-of-firm requirements, i.e., exclude enterprises with
less than a minimum number of regular employees 55 and except
certain types of occupations such as agricultural or domestic
49. United States v. Silk, 331 U. S. 704, 67 Sup. Ct. 1463, 91 L. Ed.
1757 (1947) ; Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U. S. 126, 7 Sup. Ct. 1549, 91
L. Ed. 1947 (1947).
50. National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S.
111, 64 Sup. Ct. 851, 88 L. Ed. 1170 (1944) (involving the N.L.R.A.);
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U. S. 722, 67 Sup. Ct. 1473, 91
L. Ed. 1772 (1947) (involving the F.L.S.A.).
51. Heiliger v. City of Sheldon, 236 Iowa 146, 161, 162, 18 N. W. 2d
182, 190 (1945) ; Bowser v. State Industrial Commission, 182 Ore. 42, 45,
185 P. 2d 891, 892 (1947) ; see also Loudenslager v. Gorum, 355 Mo. 181,
52. Some courts speak in terms of a presumption of coverage, see for
instance, Conrad v. Industrial Commission, 254 Wis. 574, 577, 37 N. W. 2d
60 (1949) (containing a survey of the applicable Wisconsin cases); Glen
Falls Indemnity Co. v. Clark, 75 Ga. App. 453, 43 S. E. 2d 752 (1947).
53. See for instance the discussions in Bartley v. Couture, 55 A. 2d
438 (Maine 1947) (illegal employment of minors); Bendler v. Bendler, 3
N. J. 161, 69 A. 2d 302 (1949) (employment of wife) ; Pederson v. Peder-
son, 229 Minn. 460, 39 N. W. 2d 893 (1949) (partners not employees);
Gassoway v. Gassoway & Owen, 220 N. C. 694, 18 S. E. 2d 120 (1942)(corporate officer when transacting business for the corporation does not
act as employee).
54. For details see Riesenfeld and Maxwell, Modem Social Legisla-
tion 175, 179 (1950).
55. For a survey of the provisions in the various jurisdictions see
State Workmen's Compensation Laws, as of Sept. 1950, U. S. Dep't of
Labor, Bur. of Labor Standards, Bull. No. 125, 5 (1950).
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workers. A customary clause exempts workers whose employ-
ment is casual and not in the employer's regular course of busi-
ness. While there is perhaps some reason for such exemption in
view of the difficulty of insurance coverage for occasional work,
the courts have sometimes been too prone to invoke the exemption.
The repair and modernization of any establishment which is used
for other than residential purposes by its owner, for instance,
should not come under the exemption. Yet there is much older
case law to the contrary. Bilhmayer v. Sanford,5" a case in which
the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that a man who did repair
work on several apartment houses owned by a housewife was not
covered because such ownership was an investment rather than a
business, is illustrative of the view which fortunately becomes
gradually abandoned.
A certain relief from the restrictions in the coverage provisions
of the various compensation acts has been provided by the statu-
tory or judge-made rule which prevents insurance carriers to plead
lack of coverage if the activities of a particular person were ex-
pressly included in the terms of a compensation insurance policy
or included in the computation of the premium.5 7
B.
The Nature of Compensable Harm
In the identification of compensable harm the progressive lib-
eralization of the system is perhaps even more clearly marked. The
original English Act of 1897 defined the type of compensable harm
as "personal injury by accident." ' s The successor Act of 1906 re-
tained the same phrase, but added a limited number of specified
so-called occupational diseases.5 9 Most American statutes repeated
this circumscription of the compensable harm contained in the
56. 177 Minn. 465, 225 N. W. 426 (1929). The Supreme Court of
Minnesota itself was apparently later embarrassed by its holding and im-
pliedly restricted it in Fisher v. Manzke, 208 Minn. 410, 294 N. W. 477
(1940).
57. See for instance, Ga. Code § 114-607 (1933) ; Miss Code § 6998-
40 (Cum. Supp. 1950) ; Okla. Stat. Ann. § 65 (1)-(3) (Cum. Supp. 1950) ;
Matter of Dann v. Town of Veteran, 278 N. Y. 461, 17 N. E. 2d 130
(1938); Gnagey v. Pennsylvania Thresherman & Farmers Mut. Casualty
Ins. Co., 332 Pa. 193, 2 A. 2d 740 (1938) ; Pearson v. Newt Pearson, Inc.,
222 N. C. 69, 21 S. E. 2d 879 (1942) ; Woods v. City of La Follette, 185
Tenn. 655, 207 S. W. 2d 572 (1948). But see also Service Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Blain, 140 Tex. 541, 168 S. W. 2d 854 (1943).
58. 60 & 61 Vict. c. 37, § 1(1) (1897).
59. 6 Edw. 7, c. 58, § 8 and Schedule III (1906).
1951]
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English acts"0 but did not include occupational diseases until a
later period.
At first the majority of courts took an exceedingly narrow view
about the meaning of the qualification expressed in the term "by
accident" construing it as a strict limitation on the term "personal
injury." In doing so they were influenced by contemporary English
precedents and their analysis in Professor Bohlen's aforementioned
article which stressed the English case law and suggested an arti-
ficial and most uncalled for difference in the scope of coverage ac-
cording to whether the statute used the term "by accident" or
"accidental."61
The qualification "by, accident" was held to imply two limiting
characteristics of the personal injury, viz.
1) that its occurrence be due to an unlooked for mishap or
untoward event which was not expected or designed, 
2
2) that it be traceable within reasonable limits to a definite
time, place and occasion or cause. 3
As a result the courts have experienced difficulty in finding an
accident in two major classes of personal injuries: a) where the
injury was not caused by an external and separate event or at least
some extraordinary circumstances in the work but where at the
most the injury itself was the unexpected event and resulted mere-
ly from the usual work performed in the usual manner under usual
circumstances, and b) where the injury was produced by a pro-
tracted exposure or strain.
Gradually the most forward-looking courts have whittled away
many of the self-created hurdles to a sensible application of the
compensation act. But the path in many jurisdictions is still not
60. Today 30 acts contain the English formula, viz. those of Ala.,
Alaska, Ariz., Colo., Del., Fla., Ga., Hawaii, Idaho, Ind., Kan., Ky., La.,
Me., Minn., Mo., Neb., N. H., N. J., N. M., N. C., Ore., Pa., S. C., S. D.,
Tenn., Utah, Vt., Va. Eight acts use the term "accidental," siz. Ark., D. C.,
Ill., Md., Miss., N. Y., Okla., and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Act. A number of jurisdictions have read an equivalent qualification into the
statute or use analogous terms, viz. Mich., Ohio, Tex., W. Va., Conn., Puerto
Rico, Wash. In five jurisdictions the compensability of personal injuries is
not restricted to such as are of accidental character, viz. Cal., Iowa, Mass.,
R. I., and the Federal Employees' Compensation Act.
61. See Bohlen, op. cit. supra note 44, at 337, 338.
62. For early American cases stressing this aspect of the clause "by
accident" see, e.g., Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72, 76, 86 At. 458, 460
(1913) ; Monson v. Battelle, 102 Kan. 208, 170 Pac. 801 (1918).
63. This aspect of the phrase was emphasized for instance in Liondale
v. Beach, Dye and Paint Works v. Riker, 85 N. J. L. 426, 89 AtI. 929
(1914); Matthiesen & Hageler Zinc Co. v. Industrial Board, 284 Ill. 378,
120 N. E. 249 (1918).
[Vol. 35:525
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
completely free and open. This is mainly due to the unwillingness
of the courts to clear away the underbrush of judicial glosses that
has sprung up on the words of the statute instead of by-passing the
obstacles by more or less ingenious contrivances. Thus the re-
quirement that the injury to be sustained "by accident" must be
traceable to a definite time interval, was circumnavigated with rela-
tive ease in many cases either by only looking at the ultimate physi-
cal change as the injurious event, as in the "drooped foot" or
"slipped disk" cases,68 or by resolving the gradual deterioration into
a series of "repeated traumas." 65
Perhaps the greatest confusion has resulted from the attempts
of the courts to differentiate between "accident" and "disease" for
the purpose of delimiting compensable injuries. This is especially
true with respect to the so-called "ordinary diseases of life" of the
infectious or contagious type and the cases of heart failure, back-
injury or hernia where only the work itself constitutes the sole con-
tributing cause.
At first even the liberal courts were willing to accept common
infectious or contagious diseases as accidents only if the channel
of infection was unusual and abnormal or where there was some
extreme or exceptional exposure, to heat, cold or fumes. Thus
Justice Cardozo, who apparently became the father of this ques-
64. See Fife Coal Co. v. William Young, [1940] A. C. 479 (dropped
foot); Caddy v. R. Maturi & Co., 217 Minn. 207, 14 N. W. 2d 293 (1944)
(slipped disk). Contra: Chop v. Swift & Compony, 118 Kan. 35, 233 Pac. 800
(1925) (wrist drop from prolonged handling of frozen meat).
65. Brown v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 60 Idaho 49, 87 P. 2d 1000 (1939)
(silicosis as repeated trauma) ; Aldrich v. Dole, 43 Idaho 30, 249 Pac. 87
(1926) (knee injury resulting from repeated bruises caused by faulty shift
lever of truck); American Maize Products Co. v. Michiporchik, 108 Ind.
App. 502, 29 N. E. 2d 801 (1940) (Dupuytren's contraction of finger
muscles due to traumatic concussions suffered in employment as riveter);
Winkelman v. Boeing Airplane Co., 166 Kan. 503, 203 P. 2d 171 (1949)
(loss of hearing from exposure to sound of shots while serving as instructor
for plant guards) ; Foble v. Knefely, 176 Md. 474, 6 A. 2d 48, 122 A. L. R.
831 (1939) (knee injury through series of bruises from defective adjust-
ment of knee press) ; Atlas Coal Corporation v. Scales, 198 Okla. 658, 185
P. 2d 177 (1947) (knee infection resulting from continuous bruising in
coal mine); Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Musgrave, 189 Tenn. 1, 222 S. W.
2d 22 (1949) (infection through repeated bruises on chest sustained while
operating a band saw). For a statutory recognition of this rule see Conn.
Stats. § 7416 (1949). But contra, for instance, Carlson v. Batts, 69 Idaho
456, 207 P. 2d 1023 (1949) (bursitis contracted by carpenter because his
work required kneeling position is not due to accident) ; Carter v. Inter-
national Detrola Corporation, 328 Mich. 367, 43 N. W. 2d 890 (1950)
(scalenus anticus syndrome due to use of arm muscles on assembly line) ;
Di Maria v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 134 N. J. L. 524, 49 A. 2d 243 (Sup.
Ct. 1946), affd, 135 N. J. L. 470, 52 A. 2d 698 (1947) (progressive adhesive
tenosynovitis of flexor tendons of hands resulting from vibrations of roller-
qanding gun).
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tionable distinction, granted compensation to an embalmer's helper
who had contracted blood poisoning by scratching a pimple on the
neck with hands contaminated by embalming fluid, solely because
of the peculiar channel of attack of the infection.66 But the same
court at least until recently, has persistently denied compensation
because of the lack of an accident to workers who contracted pneu-
monia and other respiratory diseases from "ordinary" exposure
to coldness or dampness. 17 Other courts similarly refused to find
an accident in the cases where the workers contracted typhoid or
food poisoning because of the working conditions.6 Fortunately
the trend of modern authority is away from these narrow precedents
both in exposure cases6 and cases of food poisoning,70 etc.
There still exists, however, a great reluctance of some courts
to grant compensation when the cause of the injury is nothing but
the usual work under usual conditions.7 1 They insist on the presence
of a separate event or at least extroardinary conditions, although
66. Connelly v. Hunt Furniture Co., 240 N. Y. 83, 147 N. E. 365
(1925).
67. The leading case is Lerner v. Rump Bros., 241 N. Y. 153, 149 N. E.
334, 41 A. L. R. 1122 (1925); now seemingly on the way to being dis-
credited, see Merriam and Vogel, "Accidental Injury" in the Court of
Appeals: The Metamorphosis of a Rule of Law, 26 Brooklyn L. Rev. 203
(1950).
68. Mills v. Columbia Gas Const. Co., 246 Ky. 464, 55 S. W. 2d 394(1932) ; State ex rel. Faribault Woolen Mills Co. v. Dist. Ct. of Rice County,
138 Minn. 210, 164 N. W. 810 (1917); Buchanan v. Md. Casualty Co., 116
Tex. 201, 288 S. W. 116 (1926).
69. See, e.g., Rinehart v. Stamper Co., 227 Mo. App. 653, 55 S. W. 2d
729 (1932) (pneumonia) and Hoage v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp.,
62 App. D. C. 77, 64 F. 2d 715 (1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 637, 54 Sup.
Ct. 54, 78 L. Ed. 554 (1933) (loss of leg due to stagnation caused by work
in refrigerator).
70. For cases of that type see Permanent Construction Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission, 380 Ill. 47, 43 N. E. 2d 557, 141 A. L. R. 1484 (1942);
Union Mining Co. v. Blank, 181 Md. 62, 28 A. 2d 568 (1942); Sebek v.
Cleveland Graphite Bronze Co., 148 Ohio St. 693, 76 N. E. 2d 892 (1947).
71. The jurisdictions which still seem classifiable as following a re-
strictive interpretation are represented by the following recent cases: Hart-
ford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Commission, 66 Ariz. 259, 186
P. 2d 959 (1947); Jones v. Industrial Commission, 217 P. 2d 589 (Ariz.
1950) ; Brooks-Scanlon, Inc. v. Lee, 44 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1950); Schlange v.
Briggs Mfg. Co., 326 Mich. 552, 40 N. W. 2d 454 (1950); Finerson v.
Century Electric Co., 227 S. W. 2d 740 (Mo. 1950) ; Muff v. Brainard, 150
Neb. 650, 35 N. W. 2d 597 (1949); Seiken v. Todd Dry Dock, 2 N. J.
469, 67 A. 2d 131 (1949) ; Meier v. Miller, 229 N. C. 243, 49 S. E. 2d 396(1948); Masse v. Robinson Co., 301 N. Y. 34, 92 N. E. 2d 56 (1950);
Gerich v. Republic Steel Corporation, 153 Ohio St. 463, 92 N. E. 2d 393(1950) ; Gulf Oil Corporation v. Kincannon, 218 P. 2d 625 (Okla. 1950)
semble; Chalfant v. Arens, 167 Ore. 649, 120 P. 2d 219 (1941) ; Rathmell v.
Wesleyville Borough, 351 Pa. 14, 40 A. 2d 28 (1944). The question was ex-
pressly reserved in Philadelphia Dairy Products Co. v. Farran, 61 A. 2d 400(Del. 1948).
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they are sometimes prone to find them. It perhaps bears mention-
ing that even recently the Supreme Court of Rhode Island had so
tied itself up in narrow interpretations72 that the legislature had to
cut the gordean knot and throw the qualification "by accident" out
altogether.78 It is likewise significant that in 1949 the Committee
on Workmen's Compensation Law of the State Bar of Michigan
recommended "that appropriate legislation be sponsored which
would eliminate from the Workmen's Compensation Act any re-
quirement that injuries to be compensable must be accidental in
nature."7 4 It might be added in parenthesis that the only basis for
the Michigan rule which restricts the compensability of injuries
other than those defined as occupational injuries and diseases to
such of an accidental nature is the title of the act and the reluctance
of some members of the Supreme Court of that state to attribute to
the occupational disease amendments of 1943 a general broadening
of the scope of the act.75 Nevertheless the court has persisted in
interpreting the mainly judge-made qualification in a fairly restric-
tive manner.7 6 Even the Supreme Court of Minnesota, usually in
line with the progressive courts, still looks for extraordinary exer-
tion in case of heart failure.7 7 Actually there exists no sound
reason why disabling personal injuries which are produced, ac-
celerated or intensified by the work should not be compensable,
regardless of unusual circumstances. The question of proof, of
course, may sometimes be beset with difficulties. But it is un-
desirable to shunt out these difficulties by a socially undesirable
interpretation of the statutory terms. It is gratifying, however, that
the number of jurisdictions which have recognized that even an
72. Parente v. Apponaug Co., 73 R. I. 441, 57 A. 2d 168 (1948);
Zielonka v. U. S. Rubber Co., 74 R. I. 82, 58 A. 2d 627 (1948), second
appeal, 65 A. 2d 460 (R.I. 1949).
73. R. I. Laws 1949, c. 2282.
74. 28 Mich. St. Bar J. No. 9, 61 (1949).
75. See the sharp split among the Justices in Hagopian v. Highland
Park, 313 Mich. 608, 22 N. W. 2d 116 (1946); but compare also the
opinions of the equally divided court in Croff v. Lakey Foundry & Machine
Co., 320 Mich. 581, 31 N. W. 2d 728 (1948) and Schlange v. Briggs Mfg.
Co., 326 Mich. 552, 40 N. W. 2d 454 (1950).
76. See Carter v. International Detrole Corp., 328 Mich. 367, 43
N. W. 2d 890 (1950) (employment connected injury to arm muscles neither
an accidental nor occupational injury) ; O'Neil v. Spencer Grocery Co., 316
Mich. 320, 25 N. W. 2d 213 (1946) (heart failure of travelling salesman
from driving car in heavy snow not a fortuitous event); Poindexter v.
Dep't of Conservation, 316 Mich. 235, 25 N. W. 2d 182 (1946) (heart
failure from excitement while testifying for employer no fortuitous event).
77. See, e.g., Sokness v. City of Virginia, 42 N. W. 2d 551 (Minn.
1950).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
injury caused by the regular work under normal conditions may be
an accident is steadily on the increase."'
So-called occupational diseases may require a special regulation
because of the special mode of their development. Most statutes
now provide for coverage either in the form of a schedule of
varying range or under a generic formula. 8 While legislative inter-
vention of some sort was necessary in the light of existing case
law, the techniques followed perpetuated by implication the limita-
tions thought to be inherent in the phrase "accident" or "acci-
dental." Actually such restrictions, especially in the case of un-
scheduled occupational diseases, constitute a relapse into the un-
suitable "assumption of risk" idea8" and even in jurisdictions
which have blanket coverage tend to produce the socially un-
desirable result of employment-connected injuries which are never-
theless non-compensable. For instance, in New York tuberculosis
contracted from a fellow-employee was recently held to be non-
compensable because under the circumstances of the case it was
neither "accidental" nor "occupational.""'
C.
The Requisite Connection With the Employment
Undoubtedly the most pronounced outward shift of the boun-
daries which circumscribe the scope of the protection accorded by
workmen's compensation has occurred in the interpretation of the
celebrated formula which defines the requisite connection with the
employment, viz. the terms "out of and in the course of the
employment."
It is perhaps not amiss to reduce the principal trends in this
process of liberalization to two general propositions: On the one
hand courts and administrative agencies have recognized to an
increasing extent that workmen's compensation involves funda-
mental policies of its own which make any reliance on tort prin-
ciples such as embodied in the ideas of scope of employment, con-
trol, proximate cause, foreseeability, blameworthiness, assumption
78. See Riesenfeld and Maxwell, Modern Social Legislation 200, text
to note 20 (1950). For an excellent judicial discussion see Southern Stevedor-
ing Co. v. Henderson, 175 F. 2d 863 (5th Cir. 1949), 34 Minn. L. Rev. 377
(1950).
79. For a recent survey see State Workmen's Compensation Laws as of
Sept. 1950, U. S. Dep't of Labor, Bur. of Labor Stands. Bull. No. 125, 10
(1950).
80. I.e., that the occupational disease was "forseeable" and therefore a
risk of the employee.
81. Harman v. Rep. Aviation Co., 298 N. Y. 285, 82 N. E. 2d 785(1948). For another instance see Carter v. International Detrola Corp., 328
Mich. 367, 43 N. W. 2d 890 (1950).
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of risk, etc., totally inapposite. -8 2 On the other hand courts and ad-
ministrative agencies have also come to realize that fixing the
boundaries of protection involves basic policy considerations defy-
ing hard and fast rules and that the various secondary tests, such
as the "added peril rule" or "common hazard rule,"83 which have
sprung up in the field are at the most preliminary working hypo-
theses which require careful scrutiny and adaptation when applied
to actual controversies.84 It might also be appropriate to emphasize
in this conjunction that regardless how faf out the boundaries of
the protection are pushed there will always be troublesome border-
line cases in which the ultimate result will necessitate a careful
balancing of conflicting interests.
The application of the requirement that to be compensable the
injury must arise out of and in the course of the employment has
produced a staggering volume of reported cases 5 and has fre-
quently been the object of re-examination by courts as well as
writers.8 Of course, here only a few very general remarks can
be made.
82. The federal Supreme Court has perhaps been particularly instru-
mental in removing the vestiges of common law tort principles from the
field of workmen's compensation, see especially the statements to that effect
in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418, 44 Sup. Ct 153, 68
L. Ed. 366 (1923) ; Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U. S. 469, 67
Sup. Ct. 801, 91 L. Ed. 1028 (1947) ; O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon Inc.,
19 U. S. L. Week 4138 (U.S. Feb 26, 1951). For other leading cases in that
vein see Matter of Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 250 N. Y. 14, 164
N. E. 726 (1928); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, 72 App.
D. C. 52, 112 F. 2d 11 (1940); Hanson v. Robitshek Schneider Co., 209
Minn. 596, 297 N. W. 19 (1941); Heiliger v. City of Sheldon, 236 Iowa 146,
161, 18 N. W. 2d 182, 190 (1945) ; Southern Stevedoring Co. v. Henderson,
175 F. 2d 863 (5th Cir. 1949). Conversely workmen's compensation cases
are of little assistance in determining the scope of tort liability to an injured
employee where it is undisputed that the injury was not employment con-
nected, Rogers v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 85 Ohio App. 421, 88 N. E. 2d
234 (1949), aff'd, 153 Ohio St. 513, 92 N. E. 2d 677 (1950).
83. See infra text to notes 122-126.
84. The truth of the statement in the text was comparatively early
recognized in a leading early English compensation case. Lord Dunedin in
Plumb v. Cobden Flour Mills Company Ltd. [1914] A. C. 62, 65 observed
pointedly: "It is often useful in striving to test the facts of a particular
case to express the test in various phrases. But such phrases are merely aids
to solving the original question and must not be allowed to dislodge the
original words. Most of the erroneous arguments which are found in this
branch of the law will be found to depend on disregarding this salutory
rule."
85. See the exasperated comment on that fact by the late Justice Murphy
in Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U. S. 469, 67 Sup. Ct. 801, 91
L. Ed. 1028 (1947).
86. For rceent treatments by writers see Horovitz, The Litigious
Phrase: "Arising Out of Employment," 3 NACCA L. J. 15 (1949); 4
NACCA L. J. 19 (1949); Schneider, Workmen's Compensation, vol. 6
(1948) ; vol. 7 (1950).
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It is frequently said that the portion of the phrase which refers
to the course of the employment envisages mainly the time, place
and external circumstances of thq disabling event while the words
"out of" connote its cause and origin.87 But although this differen-
tiation has been approved by a learned commentator as "useful
and profitable" s it must be recognized that the two aspects of the
employment connection are so closely interwoven that no true line
of distinction can be drawn and that in many instances it is im-
possible to tell whether a certain activity or conduct of the em-
ployee which contributed to the injury interrupted the course of
the employment or merely the relevant causal connection between
the employment and the injury. Viscount Haldane has come close
to the truth with the observation in a leading English case: "I
doubt whether time, place and circumstances can properly be so
sharply distinguished from other conditions. which are described
as belonging to the origin and cause as these words suggest.
s8 9
Certain cases seem to make it clear that an injury may now be
considered to have occurred "in the course" of the employment
because the employment was its cause.90 Vice versa at least some
courts have admitted that injuries may be considered as "caused"
by the employment because they were sustained during and at
the place of the employment.91 Cases of the latter type are in-
stances where the worker at the place of his work is injured by the
87. The leading American precedent for this differentiation is McNicol's
Case, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697 (1913, 1916A L. R. A. 306: ". . [Aln
injury is received 'in the course of' the employment when it comes while
the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to perform. It 'arises
out of' the employment when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon
consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the con-
ditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting
injury."
88. Brown, "Arising out of and in the course of the Employment" in
Workmen's Compensation Acts, 7 Wis. L. Rev. 15, 22 (1931).
89. Thorn or Simpson v. Sinclair, [1917] A. C. 127, 138.
90. The chief instances are the cases where an employee as e.g., a
bartender or foreman gets attacked outside his place of work because of a
quarrel in which he became involved because of and during his employment,
Field v. Charmette Knitted Fabric Co., 245 N. Y. 139, 156 N. E. 139, 156
N. E. 642 (1927) ; Scholl v. Industrial Commission, 366 Ill. 588, 10 N. E. 2d
360, 112 A. L. R. 1254 (1937) ; Zolkover v. Industrial Accident Commission,
13 Cal. 2d 584, 91 P. 2d 106 (1939).
91. See the strong language of Judge Rutledge to that effect in Hart-
ford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, 72 App. D. C. 52, 112 F. 2d
11, 14 (1940) : "No more is necessary than that the work subject the em-
ployee to a peril which comes from the fact that he is required to be in
the place where it strikes when it does so." Similarly also Simmons National
Bank v. Brown, 210 Ark. 311, 317, 195 S. W. 2d 539, 542 (1946).
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forces of the elements 92 or was attacked by an insane outsider- or
suffered an epileptic fit or fainting spell, etc.94
Actually the statutory formula must be read in toto and means
no more and no less than that an injury to be compensable must
appear to the rational mind, upon consideration of all circum-
stances, to be reasonably attributable to the employment. But be-
cause the underlying policy can be stated only in such general
terms it follows inevitably that the decision of concrete cases will
frequently involve grave doubts. Can it for instance, consistently be
held that there is an injury fairly attributable to the employment
if the hotel in which a traveling salesman has chosen to stop during
a trip burns down95 but not if he is attacked there by an insane
person" or if he slips there while shaving ?9 Can it consistently
be held that there is coverage for an employee who is attacked dur-
ing working hours by a fellow-employee jealous of the attentions
paid to the victim by a third employee of the opposite sex,98 but not
for a delivery man injured at work by a suspicious husband,99 or
for an employee attacked during employment by a colored fellow-
worker who resents the victim's refusal to loan his water bottle00 or
to accept a date ?101 Is there a material difference in employment
connection between an injury which is sustained by a worker who
urinates from a moving truck 0 2 and one which is sustained when
the employee sought to get a free ride on a convewor belt'0 3 or
92. See especially Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co., 199 La. 720,
6 So. 2d 747 (1942) (tornado) ; McKinney v. Reynolds & Mauley Lumber
Co., 79 Ga. App. 826, 54 S. E. 2d 471 (1941), 4 NACCA L. J. 91 (1949).
93. Lucie v. Bamboo Gardens, 67 Idaho 469, 185 P. 2d 712 (1947), 32
Minn. L. Rev. 852 (1948). But contra, for instance, Thornton v. R. C. A.
Service Co., 188 Tenn. 644, 221 S. 'V. 2d 454 (1949).
94. See National Automobile and Casualty Insurance Co. v. Industrial
Accident Commission, 75 Cal. App. 2d 677, 171 P. 2d 594 (1946) ; Burton
Shields Co. v. Steele, 83 N. E. 2d 623 (Ind. App. 1949) ; Revis v. N. Y.
Life Ins. Co., 226 N. C. 325, 38 S. E. 2d 97 (1946); Mausert v. Albany
Builder's Supply Co., 250 N. Y. 21, 164 N. E. 729 (1928) ; Garcia v. Texas
Indemnity Co., 146 Tex. 413, 209 S. W. 2d 333 (1948).
95. Souza's Case, 316 Mass. 332, 55 N. E. 2d 611 (1944).
96. Thornton v. R. C. A. Service Co., Inc., 188 Tenn. 644, 221 S. W.
2d 454 (1949).
97. Gibbs Steel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 243 Wis. 375, 10 N. W.
2d 130 (1943).
98. Katz v. Reissman Rothman Corp., 261 App. Div. 862, 24 N. Y. S.
2d 807 (1941), appeal denied, 285 N. Y. 859, 33 N. E. 2d 567 (1941).
99. Bluegrass Pastureland Dairies v. Meeker, 268 Ky. 722, 105 S. W.
2d 611 (1937).
100. City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission, 292 Ill. 406, 127 N. E.
49,15 A. L. R. 586 (1920).
101. Matter of Scholtzenhauer v. C. & L. Lunch Co., 233 N. Y. 12,
134 N. E. 701 (1922).
102. Karlslyst v. Industrial Commission, 243 Wis. 612, 11 N. W. 2d
179 (1943).
103. Di Lauro v. Bassetti, 133 Conn. 642, 53 A. 2d 512 (1947).
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with fatal result tried to push an abandoned baby buggy into a river
drowning in the course of such entertainment ?1"
As a result-of the extreme difficulties encountered in the ascer-
tainment of whether or not the requisite employment connection is
present some decisions, spearheaded by the federal Supreme Court
itself, have recently come to admit that there is a twilight zone in
which the expert judgment of the administrative agency will not
be disturbed, regardless of whether it finds or rejects attributability
to the employment." 5 But this judicial deference devolves upon
the administrative agency the questionable responsibility of de-
veloping without the benefit of judicial guidance the expertise
necessary for the formulation of the standards and criteria con-
trolling the area of actually the most troublesome borderline cases.
It should be useful to follow. up this discussion of the transfor-
mations in judicial thought on the scope of the protection with a
brief survey of various results which have been the consequence
thereof. On the strength of early English cases decided under the
Act of 1897106 the rule (sometimes codified by statute) became
established that ordinarily a workman is not within the protection
of the statute except while engaged on, in or about the premises,
where his services are being performed or where his services re-
quire his presence as a part of such service and during the hours
of his service as such employee. 0 7 Accordinly the so-called "Com-
ing and Going" rule sprang up which denied compensation for
injuries incurred when proceeding to and from work. In the course
of time, however, a number of exceptions have become well estab-
lished.108 Compensation is now granted to employees for injuries
104. Gaurin v. Bagley and Sewall Company, 298 N. Y. 511, 81 N. E.
2d 355 (1948).
105. See especially, O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 19 U. S. L.
Week 4138 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1951) (drowning in the attempt to rescue
stranger in distress); Di Lauro v. Bassetti, 133 Conn. 642, 645, 53 A. 2d
512, 513 (1947) (horseplay and skylarking) ; Shedlock v. Cudahy Packing
Co., 134 Conn. 672, 60 A. 2d 514 (1948) (horseplay and skylarking).
106. The English act of 1897 applied only to employment on, in or
about a railroad, mine, quarry or engineering work and this "on, in or
about" clause was authoritatively construed to refer to a physical area,
Back v. Dick Kerr & Co., Ltd. [1906] A. C. 325. The act of 1906 omitted
htis limitation, but it left its mark on the interpretation of the "out of and
in the course of" clause.
107. For references see Ruegg, Employer's Liability Act, 1880 and the
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 376, 377 (8th ed. 1910); 1 Honnold,
A Treatise on the American and English W orkmen's Compensation Law 346
et seq. especially 368 (1917) ; Harper, The Law of Workmen's Compensa-
tion 69, 79 et seq. (2d ed. 1920). The rule of the text is actually codified
in that form in 1 Minn. Stat. § 176.08 (11) (1949).
108. For a judicial catalogue of these exceptions see Cardillo v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U. S. 469, 67 Sup. Ct. 801, 91 L. Ed. 1028 (1941).
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sustained even while coming and going especially if the transporta-
tion was an incident of the employment, 0 9 if the employee was
engaged in a special mission or errand for the employer 10 or if he
followed an emergency call while on 24 hour duty.:"' In addition
the application of these exceptions has undergone a process of
constant broadening. Similarly the notion of "premises" itself has
been the subject of an increased expansion. The Supreme Court of
the United States took the lead in adding to the "actual" premises
a zone that made the customary and practicable way of ingress and
egress one of hazardY.2 Today many courts have included parking
lots,"13 even if not technically part of the premises. The protection
is not limited to the scheduled working hours, but may begin prior
thereto and last beyond them provided that the arrival and depar-
ture is not unreasonably premature or retarded." 4 The liberality
of the courts in that respect, however, sometimes leaves much to
109. See, for instance, Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., supra note
108; Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Inge, 146 Tex. 347, 208 S. W. 2d
867 (1948) ; Kobe v. Industrial Accident Commission, 215 P. 2d 736 (Cal.
2d 1950).
110. For interesting applications see Benjamin H. Sanborn Co. v. In-
dustrial Commission, 405 Ill. 50, 89 N. E. 2d 804 (1950); Bengston v.
Greening, 230 Minn. 139, 41 N. W. 2d 185 (1950) (zone of protection in-
cludes walk on employee's premises); Smith v. University of Idaho, 67
Idaho 349, 170 P. 2d 404 (1946) ; Kaplan v. Alpha Epsilon Phi Sorority,
230 Minn. 547, 42 N. W. 2d 342 (1950), 5 NACCA L. J. 61 (1950). The
last two cases also involve the 24 hours rule, note 111 infra.
111. See, e.g., Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 288 U. S. 162, 53 Sup. Ct.
380, 77 L. Ed. 676, 87 A. L. R. 245 (1933); Fogg's Case, 125 Me. 168,
132 Atl. 129 (1926) ; Van Ness v. Borough of Haledon, 136 N. J. L. 623,
56 A. 2d 888 (1948). But the zone of protection does not include the em-
ployee's own home, Henry v. Village of Coleridge, 147 Neb. 686, 24 N. W.
2d 922 (1946).
112. Cudahy v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418, 44 Sup. Ct. 153, 68 L. Ed.
366, 30 A. L. R. 532 (1923) ; Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U. S. 154,
48 Sup. Ct. 221, 72 L. Ed. 507, 66 A. L. R. 1402 (1928) ; followed e.g., in
Friere v. Matson Navigation Co., 19 Cal. 2d 8, 118 P. 2d 809 (1941);
Eargle v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., 205 S. C. 423, 32 S. E. 2d
240 (1944). But otherwise injuries sustained when coming or going have
been held to be noncompensable even if sustained in the immediate vicinity
of employer's premises, De Ponte v. State Furniture Co., 129 Neb. 282, 261
N. W. 419 (1935); Hinton v. North Georgia Warehouse Corp., 211 S. C.
370, 45 S. E. 2d 591 (1947).
113. See for instance Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Com-
mission, 28 Cal. 2d 329, 170 P. 2d 18 (1946) ; Roger's Case, 318 Mass. 308, 61
N. E. 2d 341, 159 A. L. R. 1394 (1945) ; Du Pont, De Nemours & Co. v.
Redding, 194 Okla. 52, 147 P. 2d 166 (1944); Kowcun v. Bybee, 182 Ore.
271, 186 P. 2d 790 (1947). But cf. Grazer v. Vultee Aircraft, 161 Pa. Super.
434, 55 A. 2d 538 (1947).
114. For references see Horovitz, Current Trends in Basic Principles of
Workmen 's Compensation, 12 Law Soc. J. 465, 611, 765 at 676 (1946);
Riesenfeld and Maxwell, Modern Social Legislation 246 (1950). But cf.
Yeager v. Chapman, 45 N. W. 2d 776 (Minn. 1951) (arrival one hour early
because of personal motive does not commence protection).
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be desired.115 The course of the employment is not broken because
the employee refreshes himself by taking a drink of water, getting
fresh air, smoking, etc.116 Lunch and recreation periods spent on
the premises are likewise within the course of employment" 7 and
to an increasing degree other employer-sponsored recreational and
social activities have been held to be included."18 Conversely while
activities undertaken during working hours for the exclusive bene-
fit of the employee or a third person may constitute a "temporary
detachment" from the employment," 9 the courts have become in-
creasingly reluctant to find such break if the employer was at least
indirectly benefitted120 or if the action of the employee was such
that it was by the standards of common decency compatible with
his duties as employee, such as rescue attempts in an emergency,'
21
etc.
115. For shocking rejections of the whole rule in recent cases see
McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 226 P. 2d 147 (Ariz.
1950); Pilgrim v. Nienthen, 327 Mich. 714, 42 N. W. 2d 793 (1950).
116. See Horovitz, Current Trends in Basic Principles of Workmen's
Compensation, 12 Law Soc. J. 465, 535 et seq. (1946); Horovitz, The
Litigious Phrase: "Arising Out of" Employment, 3 NACCA L. J. 15, 64
(1949); Riesenfeld and.Maxwell, Modern Social Legislation 249 (1950).
117. For details see Riesenfeld and Maxwell, Modem Social Legisla-
tion 249 (1950).
118. See Schneider, Compensability of Injuries During Employer-
Sponsored Recreation, 2 NACCA L. J. 62 (1948). For recent cases in point
see Wilson v. General Motors Corporation, 298 N. Y. 468, 84 N. E. 2d 781
(1949) ; Kelly v. Hackensack Water Co., 77 A. 2d 467 (N.J. Super. 1950).
119. The doctrine of "temporary detachment" was first authoritatively
stated in the early English case of Reed v. Great Western Railway, [1909]
A. C. 31, denying compensation to a railroad engineer who had left his engine
to get a book from a fireman of another train. The field of applicability of
this doctrine and its twin "deviation" has been constantly narrowed, but
on its strength compensation has still recently been denied not only in a
case where an employee rendered voluntary assistance to a fellow employee
in his private business, Ridler v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 224 Minn. 256, 28
N. W. 2d 859 (1947) ; but even in a case where an employee living on the
employer's premises was injured when aiding a fellow employee in improv-
ing his substandard living accommodations likewise on the employer's
premises, Stepan v. Campbell, 228 Minn. 74, 36 N. W. 2d 401 (1949); or
where the injury occurred during the lunch period on the occasion of a
union meeting on employer's premises, Kelly v. Dixie Fuel & Supply Co.,
45 N. W. 2d 356 (Mich. 1951).
120. For leading cases on the point see Wamhoff v. Wagner Elec.
Corp., 354 Mo. 711, 190 S. W. 2d 915, 161 A. L. R. 1454 (private work in
employer's plant during slack period increasing professional skill and en-
couraged by employer) ; Chapman's Case, 321 Mass. 705, 75 N. E. 2d 433
(1947) (private work for employer's customer during lunch period);
Kennedy v. Thompson Lumber Co., 223 Minn. 277, 26 N. W. 2d 459
(1947) (union steward leaving plant to call union business agent in effort
to avert strike).
121. See particularly O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 19 U. S. L.
Week 4138 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1951). But contra: Edwards v. Louisiana Forestry
Commission, 49 So. 2d 53 (La. 1950).
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The "added peril rule" which once was a threat to many re-
coveries where the employee acted carelessly or stiayed from the
customary path 22 has been laid at rest.1' A similar fate is in store
for the superficial and pernicious "common hazard test" which
prevents recovery where the injury is produced by a hazard com-
mon to the neighborhood. Courts have been prone to uphold the
finding of a special exposure, first in the "street risk"'124 and later
in other cases,' 25 and some courts have discarded it entirely as an
unwarranted gloss upon the true coverage formula. 2 Injuries from
skylarking and horseplay have been recognized more and more as
reasonably attributable to the employment. 1 2 The same is true
with respect to altercations with and attacks from patrons, strang-
ers and fellow employees, except where the motive is purely per-
122. The "added peril rule" was first authoritatively enunciated by
Lord Atldnson in Barnes v. Nunnery Colliery Co., Ltd., [1912] A. C. 44, 50,
paraphrasing Brice v. Edward Lloyd, Ltd., [1910] K. B. 804, 809. It was
adopted in a number of American cases, see Horovitz, The Litigious Phrase:
"Arising out of" Employment, 4 NACCA L. J. 19, 34 et seq. (1949);
Riesenfeld and Maxwell, Modem Social Legislation 262, 263 (1950).
123. See especially Associated Indemnity Corporation v. Industrial
Accident Commission, 18 Cal. 2d 40, 46, 112 P. 2d 615, 619 (1941) ; and
Harris v. Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers [1938] A. C. 711.
See also the comments in Horovitz, The Litigious Phrase: "Arising out of"
Employment, 4 NACCA L. J. 19, at 39, 40 (1949).
124. The "street risk" exception to the "common hazard rule" was
first clearly established in Dennis v. White and Co., [1917] A. C. 479. Its
scope has, however, fluctuated in some of the jurisdictions, see, e.g., City of
Chicago v. Industrial Commission, 389 Ill. 592, 60 N. E. 2d (1945) (license
investigator stubbing his toe on street) ; Friel v. Industrial Commission,
398 Ill. 361, 75 N. E. 2d 859 (1947) (streetcar conductor hit by piece of
glass from window shattered by football thrown by boy on street). Some
courts have denied compensation because of the absence of a street risk in
cases where the injury resulted on the premises from objects thrown from
the street or adjacent premises, Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 2d 292, 110 P. 2d 676 (1941); Auman v.
Breckenridge Telephone Co., 188 Minn. 256, 246 N. W. 889 (1933) ; Lebeda
v. Pongracz, 256 N. Y. 566, 177 N. E. 140 (1931); Nowicki v. Byrne, 73
R. I. 89, 54 A. 2d 7 (1947). But cf. Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Industrial
Accident Com'n, 86 Cal. App. 2d 726, 195 P. 2d 919 (1948) ; Industrial In-
demnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com'n, 95 Cal. App. 2d 443, 214 P. 2d 41(1950).
125. See as typical examples, Mixon v. Kalman, 133 N. J. L. 113, 42
A. 2d 309 (1945) ; Bales v. Covington, 312 Ky. 551, 228 S. W. 2d 446 (1950).
126. See, e.g., Olson v. Trinity Lodge, 226 Minn. 141, 32 N. W. 2d
255 (1948).
127. The limits are still in dispute within the various jurisdictions, see,
e.g., Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Com'n, 26 Cal. 2d 286,
158 P. 2d 9, 159 A. L. R. 313 (1945) (reversing prior holdings) ; Shedlock v.
Cudahy Packing Co., 134 Conn. 672, 60 A. 2d 514 (1948); Zarba v. Lane,
322 Mass. 132, 76 N. E. 2d 318 (1947) ; Ognibene v. Rochester Mfg. Co.,
298 N. Y. 85, 80 N. E. 2d 749 (1948) ; Allsep v. Daniel Construction Co.,
216 S. C. 268, 57 S. E. 2d 427 (1950) ; cf. Riesenfeld and Maxwell, Modem
Social Legislation 279 (1950).
1951]
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sonal and totally unrelated to the employment. 2 Of course, again
the judicial attitudes vary a great deal in regard to the exact limits.
CONCLUSION
Workmen's compensation during the forty years of its existence
has manifested itself as a vigorous system which has grown steadily
in width and depth. This proves that its underlying policy was
needed and in harmony with the great trend of social developments.
Whether its chances for °survival are equally good is, however, diffi-
cult to predict. The most fundamental problem, of course, is the
question whether it is advisable to follow the English example again
and to maintain industrial injury insurance at least as a structural-
ly separate branch in a future comprehensive social insurance pro-
gram which embraces also non-industrial disease and accident in-
surance covering both medical costs and wage loss. But even apart
from this major policy question the time has come for a re-examina-
tion, whether or not the existing structure and administration of
the benefit formulae possesses inherent defects which must be
cured to keep the now middle-aged system from decline and death.
128. The landmark case which prompted a veritable reorientation in
the compensability of injuries from assaults and fights, is the late Justice
Rutledge's great opinion in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo,
72 App. D. C. 52, 112 F. 2d 11 (1940). Prior thereto compensation for in-juries from attacks by fellow employees, patrons, or strangers was granted
in many jurisdictions only in the case of special exposure or where the
work was the object of the quarrel and where the victim was not the ag-
gressor. For the evolution and present state of the law on the question, see
Horovitz, The Litigious Phrase: "Arising out of" Employment, 4 NACCA
L. J. 19, 47 et seq. (1949) ; Riesenfeld and Maxwell, Modern Social Legis-
lation 286 et seq. (1950).
129. The English policy of keeping industrial accident insurance a
separate branch in the National Insurance System was based on the recom-
mendations of Sir William Beveridge in his report entitled Social In-
surance and Allied Services 35 (American edition, MacMillan Co., 1942).
The Federal Security Agency, conversely, favors a unified single basic in-
surance system, (1947) Fed. Soc. Agency Ann. Rep. Section One 3, 9, 14
(1948).
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